New to the UK market are Soja soya flours and ingredients from Austria. Soja produces gluten- and lactose-free whole soy products and is currently supplying into international bakery and pasta brands.These range from enzyme-active soy flour, Soja Austria Pan, to soy flakes, Soja Austria Flakes. The finely ground soy flour is available in various toasting grades, according to customer requirements.”Compared with the American bean, Soja Austria Pan has a higher enzymatic activity, which will allow British bakeries to produce fluffy toast bread and crispy white breads,” claims the firm. “The warm, dry climate of summer in Austria is ideal for the delicate soy plant. Nutritious soil, clean water and well-chosen seeds allow superior quality soybeans to thrive.”In addition, the company supplies soy fibres and nuts, distributed in the UK through Thew Arnott & Co.The products are guaranteed non-GMO.
Gay Adoptions August 1, 2004 Regular News Let me preface this criticism by noting that the care of children should be foremost among the pressing concerns for any state. This requires an open and balanced debate on what constitutes the best policy for handling child welfare issues. It is with that need for a balanced approach in mind that I sat stunned after reading the July 15 article on the Family Law Section having voted to support gay adoptions.I have rarely encountered a more biased, politically correct valentine of an article. Regardless of whether one supports or opposes the ban on gay adoption, how can there be a balanced perspective on the issue when a supposedly objective article in the News clearly presents only one side of the debate — and in the most glowing and uncritical phraseology? While various sources were quoted throughout the article supporting gay adoption, such as an ACLU attorney, there was no reference to any opposition on lifting the ban. Moreover, there was no effort to depict grounds which reasonable people may have for supporting continuation of the ban. Does the reporter automatically presume that it’s an impossibility for reasonable people of goodwill to differ on this issue?If a genuine policy debate is to be promulgated by the News on any topic, then the publication should at minimum attempt to adopt an objective journalistic standard. Would it be too much to ask for reporters to seek additional sources of perhaps slightly differing opinion? Or to undertake basic investigation on major policy disputes? Mitchell A. Meyers Raleigh, NCGrievance Survey This is in response to the June 15 News story headlined “Commission gets grievance survey.”I am now winding up my third and final year as a public member of a grievance committee in the 13th Judicial Circuit. I agreed to serve on the committee because I was hopeful some of my prejudices about attorneys, accumulated over 35 years as a CPA in public practice, might be eased.During my service I have been impressed with the dedication and diligence of my committee, and am very satisfied we have fulfilled expectations a reasonable and informed public should accept. I responded to the survey myself, and contributed to the 97 percent approval rating returned by grievance committee members.I am, however, alarmed by the 14 percent satisfaction rating from complainants, which suggests, at least to this public member, that somehow the public is not convinced the grievance process really works and tends to believe “it is only a conspiracy by the lawyers to protect their own.” Further, I understand this circuit, alone, needs seven grievance committees, each with approximately the same caseload, to address the volume of public grievances.Unfair and unreasonable though public expectations may be, the gap between the admirable efforts of the grievance committee process and public perception of the legal profession, and its miscreants in particular, is damning, and a ticking time bomb at the very heart of the central mechanism of a stable society.It must be acknowledged some of the complaints our committee has considered had no merit, some were rooted in a client’s disappointment in the results of a meritless case, or perhaps personality conflicts, et al. However, the public perception, as evidenced in the 14 percent satisfaction rating, seems to be much different and suggests that perhaps some of the $10 million spent each year on the process needs to be directed to satisfying the public the process is working, and effectively so.I hope the survey will help the Bar’s Special Commission on Lawyer Regulation to narrow the gap between public satisfaction and the dedicated, diligent efforts of the various committees to render sound and equitable decisions. Richard D. Flemings LutzVirgil Hawkins According to a letter in the June 15 News, “[a]s late as 1957, the Florida Supreme Court, by a 5-2 decision, ruled it would not order the University of Florida Law School to admit a qualified black man, Virgil Hawkins, even though the U.S. Supreme Court had ordered it to do so.” Unfortunately, the writer does not provide us with a citation to the alleged order from the U.S. Supreme Court.The Hawkins case made five appearances in the U.S. Supreme Court. On November 13, 1951, Mr. Hawkins’ “[p]etition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida [was] denied for want of a final judgment.” 342 U.S. 877.On May 24, 1954, “the case [was] remanded for consideration in light of the Segregation Cases decided May 17, 1954.” 347 U.S. 971. This is not a direct order to admit Mr. Hawkins. As ordered, the Florida Supreme Court proceeded to “consider” the matter. 83 So. 2d 20.On March 12, 1956, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that its 1954 order cited the wrong case. The Segregation Cases, involving elementary school children, had no application to Mr. Hawkins, who was seeking admission to a law school. Mr. Hawkins’ case was governed by Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, all of which predated the Brown decision. The U.S. Supreme Court declared that Mr. Hawkins “is entitled to prompt admission under the rules and regulations applicable to other qualified candidates.” This is not necessarily a direct order to admit Mr. Hawkins. The order is capable of being construed as merely a direction to consider his application for admission under the rules and regulations that apply to every other applicant. The Florida Supreme Court gave it the latter interpretation. 93 So. 2d 354.The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1956 order is poorly written for another reason. The first sentence is “[t]he petition for certiorari is denied.” Further along, the U.S. Supreme Court states that “[t]he petition for writ of certiorari is granted.” The last words of the 1956 order are “Certiorari denied.”The State of Florida moved for rehearing, which the U.S. Supreme Court denied without comment on April 23, 1956. 351 U.S. 915. Not surprisingly, the Florida Supreme Court made the most of the confusing 1956 opinion. 93 So. 2d 354.On October 14, 1957, the case made its fifth and final appearance in the U.S. Supreme Court. Mr. Hawkins’ “[p]etition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida [was] denied without prejudice to the petitioner seeking relief in an appropriate United States District Court.” 355 U.S. 839.In my view, this inept performance by the U.S. Supreme Court, and its failure to deal with the Florida Supreme Court in a forthright and peremptory manner, is at least equally responsible for the injustice that was perpetrated on Mr. Hawkins, and accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court must bear at least an equal portion of the blame. John Paul Parks Phoenix August 1, 2004 Letters